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The International Labour Organization (ILO) promotes labour standards and decent work to coun-
ter a global ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of job regulation. By analysing Thailand’s experiences, we
consider three questions: 1) How might we characterize Thai capitalism?; 2) What are Thailand’s
labour market contexts for human resource management and industrial relations?; and 3) What is
Thailand’s situation regarding decent work and how is it related to politics, ILO labour standards
and labour law? We identify two Thai labour-market contexts: state-owned and private enterprises
where there is unionization (Type A); and public services/smaller enterprises/informal work where
unionization is negligible (Type B). We find implementation of decent work is patchy. We suggest
that Thailand reforms its tripartite agency to promote decent work and improve human resource
management. These steps are more likely to be more effective and sustained under a parliamentary
democracy than under a military junta. Our analysis has relevance also for other economies.
Keywords: decent work, ILO labour standards, industrial relations, International Labour Organ-
ization, Thailand
Key points
1 The ILO labour standards are significant international conventions, recommenda-
tions, declarations and protocols that may influence national labour laws and
industrial relations.
2 The impact of ILO labour standards that relate to decent work is patchy in Thailand
and contrasting in two types of Thai labour market, which we call Types A and B.
3 Implementing the decent work agenda may encourage managers to deploy workers
in more productive and innovative ways.
4 As well as advancing Thailand’s economic and social development, more decent
work in Thailand would improve Thai people’s working lives.
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5 Thailand should reform its tripartite national institution that can foster the imple-
mentation of the decent work agenda. This would be a worthwhile institutional
innovation.
6 Such improvements are more likely to be achieved and sustained under parliamen-
tary democracy than under military rule.
Since its establishment in 1919, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has pro-
duced conventions, recommendations, declarations and protocols. These are its labour
standards.1 A priority for the ILO is to ‘promote opportunities for women and men to
obtain decent work’.2 Its decent work agenda sets four strategic objectives (job creation,
rights at work, social protection and social dialogue, with gender equality a cross-cutting
objective). Further, as a constituent of the United Nations (UN), the ILO aims to promote
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals that include promoting decent work. The goals:
‘aim to encourage sustained economic growth by achieving higher levels of productivity
and through technological innovation . . . to achieve full and productive employment, and
decent work, for all women and men by 2030’ (UN 2015; italics added).
Although there is an annual World Day for Decent Work, and most people probably
agree with the concept, there is international controversy about its implementation.
Decent work can be seen as laudable in promoting the dignity of workers, advancing
human rights in workplaces and helping to eradicate poverty, but some governments may
only appear to support it, rather than enforce it. Such inaction reflects an assumption that
if their country offers low labour costs, limits the coverage of labour laws and ignores
other ILO labour standards, it will attract foreign direct investment (FDI), thereby creat-
ing jobs and strengthening the national economy. Similarly, enterprises may seek to maxi-
mize profits by outsourcing some of their activities to suppliers in countries where labour
costs are lower and workers’ rights ignored. Here, we consider Thailand’s experience with
regard to the decent work agenda.
The ILO’s Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific is in Thailand, one of the ILO’s 187
member states. Thailand is also a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). It has a population of 66 million people with a labour force of almost 40 mil-
lion. It is a centralized ‘constitutional monarchy’ that in recent years has alternated
between government by parliamentary democracy and by military junta. Unlike other
Southeast Asian countries, Thailand (which means ‘land of independence’) was never col-
onized. It is the world’s 21st largest economy, almost the same size as the Australian econ-
omy.3 Thailand has emerged from being a developing economy towards being a
developed economy.4 Currently, manufacturing, agriculture and tourism are the most
important segments of the economy. Thailand has attracted much investment by multi-
national enterprises in electronics and vehicle assembly.
Thailand’s labour productivity growth rate has been rising at approximately
3%–4% a year for decades. Much of this growth is fostered by foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) from Europe, the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and other
© 2018 The Authors. Compilation and layout © The Australian HR Institute. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources
published by John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd on behalf of Australian HR Institute
540
Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 56
Asian countries. Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew by nearly 4%
between 2001 and 2017,5 but its GDP per capita is still relatively low at US$5900,6
only a little higher than a third of the average GDP per capita of all countries, US
$15 800. Thailand is a significant emerging capitalist economy that has been trans-
formed by export-oriented industrialization. It seems to be attractive to FDI and to
tourists. Its experiences may be relevant to those trying to implement or to explain
human resource management (HRM) and industrial relations (IR) policies or
practices in other emerging economies in ASEAN and beyond.
In this article, we discuss three main research questions: 1) How might we characterize
Thai capitalism? For example, in terms of the distinction between two ‘varieties of capital-
ism’ (Bamber et al. 2016; Hall and Soskice 2001), does Thailand fit into either of the two
ideal types, a liberal market economy (LME) or a co-ordinated market economy (CME)?
2) What is the labour-market context for HRM and IR in Thailand? and 3) What is the sit-
uation with decent work in Thailand and how is it related to politics, ILO labour stan-
dards and Thai labour law? Before summarizing our conclusions and making suggestions,
we consider these questions under the following headings: Law and development, labour
law and industrial relations; ILO labour standards; Decent work; Thai capitalism, politics,
unions and the application of ILO labour standards; and Discussion of Thai experiences.
Our research methods comprise an analysis of laws, ILO labour standards and other rele-
vant documents; observations of many meetings; and discussions and interviews with key
informants.
Law and development, labour law and industrial relations
Law may have a developmental purpose, for example, as a tool of social engineering
(Pound 1922; Presser 2002), and it can be used to shape national development (Samy and
Dehejia 2007). Formalization of laws thus can help to develop institutions to facilitate
public policy implementation.
Internationally, labour law can be progressive, for instance, when influenced by Robert
Owen’s campaign to legislate uniform labour protection in Europe. International cam-
paigns for labour standards were adopted in Switzerland, Germany and France in 1889,
1890 and 1900, contributing to the creation of the International Association for Labour
Legislation in 1901 (Kaufman 2004, 69–72). Subsequently, the ILO developed its labour
standards. The ILO’s work in the IR field could be seen as ‘a middle way’ that aimed to
foster peace in the world of work, in spite of the inevitable conflicts of interest between
the industrial relations (IR) parties (Suttawet 2015).
The ILO Declaration of Philadelphia (ILO 1944) states that ‘labour is not a commod-
ity’. Workers may have rights to form unions that can represent them to enterprise owners
and managers and to promote their interests. The ILO and certain other international
agencies are advocates of human rights and workers’ rights in employing organizations
(Addo and Martin 2016; Rivera 2016; Ruggie 2013). Nevertheless, many local, as well as
multinational enterprises, adopt unitary7 forms of HRM and do not recognize unions.
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Industrial relations include rule-making processes conducted by the state, employers
and workers and their associations (Dunlop 1993). Countries can use labour laws to regu-
late IR and to improve the quality of employees’ working lives. Ratifying ILO labour
standards can be a crucial step towards improving national labour laws that may promote
decent work and sustainable development. In this millennium, ILO labour standards have
increasingly focused on social progress in the global economy and the relationship with
sustainable development (Novitz 2010; Novitz and Mangan 2011; Sengenberger 2005).
The ILO labour standards are the most significant international labour laws that influence
national labour laws and IR.
ILO labour standards
Any ILO member state may formally ratify a labour standard (e.g. an ILO convention)
and include it in their national legislation. Or, rather than ratifying all 189 ILO conven-
tions, ILO member states may apply some of them informally, as guidelines, perhaps
adapted to their ideology and context. The progress of ratification reflects the govern-
ment’s policy, the capacity of its labour institutions and mechanisms and also the extent
of technical co-operation with the ILO.
Since the mid-1990s, efforts to progress the implementation of ILO labour standards
have included three landmark events: the Global Summit for Development in Copenhagen
in 1995; the World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Singapore in
1996; and the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (ILO 1998).
These events have helped to reinforce the importance of the core (fundamental) ILO
labour standards. The core labour standards are included in eight ILO conventions:
1 Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (87 & 98)
2 Elimination of discrimination in employment (100 & 111)
3 Elimination of forced and compulsory labour (29 & 105)
4 Abolition of child labour (138 & 182)
Various interests8 promote these eight conventions as encapsulating rights for workers
all over the world. The ILO and others have promoted these core conventions as
important counterbalances to the WTO’s neoliberal agenda since the 1990s.
The ILO set a 2015 deadline for all of its member states to ratify all eight core conven-
tions. By 2017, more than 80% of them had ratified all eight (ILO 2017a). In ASEAN, the
Philippines, Indonesia and Cambodia have ratified all eight, Singapore and Malaysia six,
Vietnam and Laos five, Myanmar three and Brunei only two conventions (see Table 1).
Of the ASEAN+6 countries (see Appendix 1), Australia has ratified the most core con-
ventions (seven), but has ratified 58 ILO conventions in total. Despite being one of the
ILO’s founders, by 2018 Thailand had ratified only six core conventions, plus one on gov-
ernance. The two core conventions it has not ratified are freedom of association and the
right to collective bargaining (87 & 98). Thailand has also ratified 11 technical
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conventions (so it has ratified 18 conventions in total). In terms of its convention ratifica-
tion, then, Thailand is lagging behind Australia (and many other countries).
Decent work
The ILO’s former director general, Juan Somavia, introduced the decent work concept at
the International Labour Conference in 1999 (ILO 1999). He saw the primary goal of the
ILO as promoting the opportunity for people to obtain decent and productive work in
conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity, supported by the ILO’s four
strategic objectives: job creation, rights at work, social protection and social dialogue, with
gender equality as a cross-cutting objective.9
The ILO classifies its labour standards into 24 categories (see Appendix 2). In the first
category are the IR standards, which include freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining (see the categorization of IR standards in Appendix 3). At least 10 IR ILO labour
standards should be seen as especially important for decent work: 1) Freedom of Associa-
tion and Protection of the Right to Organize; 2) Collective Bargaining; 3) Conciliation
and Arbitration; 4) Consultation; 5) Communications within the Undertaking; 6) Work-
ers’ Representatives; 7) Examination of Grievances; 8) Tripartite Consultation; 9) Labour
Administration; and 10) Labour Relations in Public Services.
The decent work concept is multifaceted, and therefore, difficult to measure. There is
controversy over the measurement of the extent of decent work between countries (ILO
2008, Nizami and Prasad 2017; Sehnbruch et al. 2015). Nonetheless, the ILO Declaration
on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization recommends that member states may consider
‘the establishment of appropriate indicators or statistics, if necessary with the assistance of
the ILO, to monitor and evaluate progress of the decent work agenda’ (ILO 2008).
Table 1 Ratification of core ILO labour standards by ASEAN members
Country Convention Ratification total
87 98 29 105 100 111 138 182
Brunei ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ U U 2
Cambodia U U U U U U U U 8
Indonesia U U U U U U U U 8
Laos ✗ ✗ U ✗ U U U U 5
Malaysia ✗ U U U U ✗ U U 6
Myanmar U ✗ U ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ U 3
Philippines U U U U U U U U 8
Singapore ✗ U U U U ✗ U U 6
Thailand ✗ ✗ U U U U U U 6
Vietnam ✗ ✗ U ✗ U U U U 5
✗ = non-ratification,U = ratification.
Source: ILO (2017a).
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Measuring decent work is facilitated, however, by the ILO Decent Work Indicators (ILO
2013) corresponding to the Decent Work Agenda’s four objectives. These indicators are
subdivided into 10 elements: 1) employment opportunities; 2) adequate earnings and pro-
ductive work; 3) decent working time; 4) work, family and personal life; 5) work that
should be abolished; 6) stability and security of work; 7) equal opportunity in employ-
ment; 8) safe work environment; 9) social security; and 10) social dialogue (ILO 2013).
Furthermore, one approach (ILO 2013) is to try to consider the country’s laws and
formal regulations. For example, the ILO specifies a list of 21 legal indicators of decent
work (see Appendix 4).
Thai capitalism, politics, unions and the application of ILO labour standards
Varieties of capitalism
Since 1958, under various governments, Thailand has published 12 National Economic
(and Social) Development Plans.10 With such these plans, Thailand may appear to have a
form of centrally planned development that might be more like that of a CME. Arguably,
however, its approach to the regulation of its IR and related matters makes Thailand seem
rather more like an LME. Since the 1990s, most Thai governments have generally pro-
moted neoliberal economic policies more typical of an LME, minimizing the regulation of
labour markets, with relatively little regulation that promotes employment protection (cf.
Baccaro and Howell 2011). Perhaps Thailand, then, is ‘a hybrid’ variety of capitalism as it
has mixed characteristics.11 In the face of globalization, Thai policy makers with regard to
its labour markets and its HRM have increased their focus on competing with other
ASEAN member states (Napathorn and Kuruvilla 2018). Against this background, let us
review Thai politics, IR and unions.
Politics, industrial relations and unions
The prevailing military regime has constrained unions that were already weak (Brown
2016). Thai politics have significantly influenced IR practices and the potential of Thai
unions (Mabry 1979). In the current millennium, Thai democracy has been disrupted by
military dictatorships that have built on internal political conflict. Military juntas have
conducted two coups – in 2006 and 2014 – each leading to a new constitution. The gov-
ernment after the 2006 coup was not fully controlled by the military, but the post-2014
government is run and fully controlled by the military, representing a return to state
authoritarianism (Baker 2016; Hewison 2015). Despite talking about a ‘return to democ-
racy’, the post-2014 military government seems to be in no hurry to foster a return to full
democracy and is trying constitutionally to continue its control over a future elected
government (Hewison 2018).
There is a schism in Thai politics between two movements that have driven sporadic
protests in Thailand, the red-shirts and the yellow-shirts.12
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The red-shirts support a mixture of progressive and populist policies associated with
former Prime Ministers Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister Yingluck Shinawatra. The red-
shirts are allies of the Pheu Thai Party (a party for Thais). Their members are mainly rural
and suburban workers, and other people from outside Bangkok, especially from the north
and the north-east. They also include certain students and academics who oppose the
military, as well as left-wing and liberal activists and some of the new middle-class busi-
ness people who see attempts by the urban and military elite to control Thai politics as a
threat to democracy.
The yellow-shirts are a network of royalists, ultra-nationalists and urban middle-class
people known as the People’s Alliance for Democracy that was later replaced by the
People’s Democratic Reform Committee. They are committed to a conservative
ideology and the king, and less concerned than the red-shirts with such principles of
democracy as sovereignty of the people and elected governments. They strongly oppose
the Shinawatras.
The conflict in the political domain has influenced many aspects of Thailand, includ-
ing its labour administration, IR, unions and the promotion of decent work via the adop-
tion of ILO labour standards.
ILO labour standards in Thailand
Thailand’s Ministry of Labour is responsible for labour standards, which are administered
by tripartite committees. As already mentioned, Thailand has not ratified two core ILO
labour standards, nor most of the ILO’s other IR labour standards. Why have Thai govern-
ments repeatedly refused to ratify such ILO labour standards? Among other reasons, Thai
governments have feared that ratification would encourage increased unionism, not only
among private-sector and state-owned enterprise workers who are already organized under
the 1975 and 2000 labour laws, but also among state employees, who have never had such
rights. The Thai state has long discouraged its own employees, employees in essential ser-
vices and transnational migrant workers from unionizing and engaging in collective bar-
gaining. Its rationale has been that this would destabilize the national economy and
security.13 Unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continue to pressure gov-
ernments to ratify these two core ILO labour standards. In comparison with the Thai state,
employers seem to be less explicit in opposing the ratification of these two conventions.
As mentioned, Thai governments have a weak record in terms of ratifying ILO con-
ventions (Table 2). Of the ILO IR labour standards, Thailand has voluntarily endorsed
conventions 87 and 98 as well as a recommendation about workers’ representatives, which
Thailand incorporated into its Labour Relations Act, 1975. But such endorsements of
conventions and recommendations are less important than the formal ratification of
conventions.
Thai labour laws and the application of ILO labour standards
To assess Thailand’s labour law and the application of ILO labour standards, we could
focus on the last three of the ILO 21 indicators (ILO 2013) in Appendix 4 – freedom of
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association and the right to organize, collective bargaining and tripartite consultation –
but these are insufficient. For a fuller assessment, it is appropriate to add labour adminis-
tration and public-service IR, with other IR labour standards. Of the 18 conventions rati-
fied by Thailand, 16 were in force in 2018, one had been denounced, and one had been
ratified only recently (see Table 2). By the same year, 2018, Thailand had enacted 16
principal labour laws (see Table 3). To what extent, then, do Thai labour laws incorporate
the ILO’s decent work agenda?
Among Thailand’s labour laws, the IR laws are most likely to reflect ILO labour stand-
ards. In Thailand, as in many other countries, IR practices are different in state-owned
enterprises from those in the private sector. These two segments are regulated in distinct
ways, by the Labour Relations Act (1975) in the private sector, and the State Enterprise
Labour Relations Act (2000), which applies to state-owned enterprises. We focus mainly
on these two segments since these are the most highly regulated. Table 4 compares Thai
labour laws and the ILO’s IR labour standards. Table 5 analyses Thai labour laws, the
ILO’s IR labour standards and decent work indicators.
Table 2 ILO conventions ratified by Thailand
Fundamental conventions
1 C29 – Forced Labour, 1930 (1969)
2 C100 – Equal Remuneration, 1951 (1999)
3 C105 – Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957 (1969)
4 C111 – Discrimination (Employment & Occupation), 1958 (2017)
5 C138 – Minimum Age, 1973 (2004)
6 C182 – Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999 (2001)
Governance (priority) convention
1 C122 – Employment Policy, 1964 (1969)
Technical conventions
1 C14 – Weekly Rest (Industry), 1921 (1968)
2 C19 – Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation), 1925 (1968)
3 C80 – Final Articles Revision, 1946 (1947)
4 C88 – Employment Service, 1948 (1969)
5 C104 – Abolition of Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers), 1955 (1964)
6 C116 – Final Articles Revision, 1961 (1962)
7 C123 – Minimum Age (Underground Work), 1965 (1968) not in force
8 C127 – Maximum Weight, 1967 (1969)
9 C159 – Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled Persons), 1983 (2007)
10 MLC2006 – Maritime Labour, 2006 (2016)
11 C187 – Occupational Safety and Health, 2006 (2016)
Thai implementation date (in parentheses) at the end of each line; C, convention; MLC, maritime
labour convention.
Source: ILO (2017c).
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Discussion of Thai experiences
Industrial relations and decent work practices are substantially influenced by government
policy and action, which varies in Thailand under the contrasting regimes of parliamen-
tary democracy and military junta. How can we summarize the contrasting political con-
texts with regard to IR and decent work policies? Under parliamentary democracy, IR was
included in the democratic 1997 Constitution, together with social security and workers’
remuneration schemes. In the 2007 Constitution, state employees could be represented by
unions. This constitution included IR and notions of tripartism whereby workers had
rights to elect their own representatives.
The military’s 2017 Constitution also says that human rights are guaranteed. However,
the 2017 Constitution has only a conditional provision for state employees to be repre-
sented by unions. The 2017 Constitution appears to give state employees the same rights
as other employees, such as freedom of association and unions. But such rights are heavily
qualified and are permitted only if state employees do not disturb national security, public
welfare or social order. There are further constitutional limitations on their rights by spe-
cial laws that regulate politics, discipline, performance and the ethics of state employees.
Under parliamentary democracy, the enactment and enforcement of labour laws were
closely monitored by unions, the independent National Law Reform Commission and
NGOs. Decent work practices were also fostered by tripartite agencies in which unions
had a voice. Under the post-2014 military government, however, labour law reforms have
focused on simple changes to laws. In 2015, the National Law Reform Commission, an
independent public agency, was dissolved and since then many changes have been
Table 3 Thai labour laws
1 Thai Civil and Commercial Code (Hire of Service and Hire of Work) 2468 (1925)
2 Labour Relations Act 2518 (1975)
3 The Labour Protection Act 2541 (1998)
4 State Enterprise Labour Relations Act 2543 (2000)
5 The Establishment of and Procedure for Labour Court 2522 (1979)
6 Provident Fund Act 2530 (1987)
7 Employment and Job Seeker Protection Act 2528 (1985)
8 Alien Employment Act 2521 (1978)
9 Skill Development Promotion Act 2545 (2002)
10 Social Security Act 2533 (1990)
11 Workmen’s Compensation Act 2537 (1994)
12 Home Workers Protection Act 2553 (2010)
13 Occupational Safety Health and Act 2554 (2011)
14 Persons with Disabilities’ Quality of Life Promotion Act (2007)
15 Thailand Professional Qualification Institute (Public Organization) Royal Degree 2554 (2011)
16 Maritime Labour Act 2558 (2015)
Source: ILOSTAT (2015), Ministry of Labour (2017).
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proposed to the Labour Relations Law. Nevertheless, there are still different regulatory
arrangements for IR in private enterprises and in state-owned enterprises.
In contrast, under the military, unions have fewer opportunities to exercise an inde-
pendent voice and the ILO also seems to be less active in encouraging decent work
Table 4 Comparison of ILO IR standards with Thai laws and IR practices
ILO IR standards Thai IR laws/practices
C87 – Freedom of Association and Right to
Organize
Workers and employers can unionize, except
armed services and police
States cannot intervene in employers’ and
workers’ unions
Unions make their own rules and can join
federations
Collective organization cannot be a condition
of employment
Workers’ and employers’ unions allowed in state-
owned and private enterprises, but not for
state bureaucrats
Workers’ and employers’ unions must be
registered
Enterprise unions grew in 1970s–1990s; since
then there has been more growth of industrial
unions
C98 and 154 – Collective Bargaining
State should promote collective bargaining by
employers’ and workers’ unions
Parties must not sign contracts that contradict
collective agreements, which should cover all
workers in a category
Dispute-settlement processes
State has promoted ‘consultation’, but not
collective bargaining. State feared that
collective bargaining might promote IR
conflict
There is a little collective bargaining at industrial
level, for example, for metal industries
No national collective bargaining, but national
union centres demand improvements annually
on 1 May
Collective bargaining outcomes registered
annually; covers only a few of the 3 million
enterprises
C150 – Labour Administration
There shall be consultation, co-operation and
bargaining between state, employers’ and
workers’ unions
Voluntary association and collective
bargaining
Ministry of Labour began 1993, covering: labour
welfare and protection; employment; skill
development; social security
Tripartite National Labour Advisory Council
of governments’, employers’ and workers’
representatives began 1976; less active since
early 2000s
Two types of unionism: enterprise unions and
industrial unions
Workers’ and employers’ unions obliged to
support good relations, education and
training, but not collective bargaining
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policies. Under democratic governments, unions were part of a relatively independent
labour movement, interested in developing a welfare state. Although unions are
formally restricted by the IR law from being involved in politics, in practice state-owned
enterprise unions are more potent in Thai politics than private-enterprise unions. Many
private-enterprise unions are informally aligned with the red-shirts, but they do not get
explicitly involved in politics. Most of the state-owned enterprise unions are formally
aligned with the yellow-shirts. Hence, the influences of the red-shirt and yellow-shirt
movements are demarcated with regard to unions, the labour market and potentially on
decent work.
Table 4 (continued)
ILO IR standards Thai IR laws/practices
C151 – Public Services
No discrimination re union officials and
members
Unions must be independent
State not to interfere in employers’ and
workers’ unions
State to promote collective bargaining between
state and unions
State dispute-settlement processes
State officials and general workers have rights
State-owned enterprise workers may form only
enterprise unions
State-enterprise unions can federate. (There is
an unregistered federation and a legal
federation.)
State-owned enterprise workers’ unions can
join with private-sector unions
Bipartite enterprise-relations committees
mandatory in each enterprise; chair held by the
state
C135 –Workers’ Representatives
Workers union representatives and/or elected
workers at the enterprise and protected from
dismissal. Representatives regulated and can
use facilities provided by the enterprise
Workers’ committees can be established in private
enterprises by election of workers or appointed
by unions according to the union density
There can be an enterprise committee on
labour welfare, but only in private enterprises
with > 49 employees
C144 – Tripartite Consultation
Most representative workers’ and employers’
unions should be consulted re. the ILO’s
annual meeting labour standards
There are about 20 national tripartite bodies. The
chairs are mostly from the state side
No annual meeting of tripartite bodies to
discuss ratification of labour standards
Source: Authors’ summary based on the websites of ILO, Thai government, employers and workers’
unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labour law consultants and public debates, for example
www.mol.co.th (Ministry of Labour), relation.labour.go.th (Relations Division, Department of Labour
Protection and Welfare) http://ecot.or.th/2016/th (Employer Confederation of Thailand), http://www.
econthai.com (Employers’ Confederation of Thai Trade & Industry (ECONTHAI), http://voicelabour.org
(A Labour NGO), https://thailabourmuseum.org (Thai Labour Museum), www.clt.or.th (Thai Labour
Organization) and Facebook of the Thai Labour Solidarity Committees Organization).
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The big state-owned-enterprise unions were involved in ousting elected governments
twice since 2006. First, along with The People Alliance for Democracy, these unions
opposed the Taksin Shinawatra government’s 2006 privatization policy. Second, these
unions sided with the opposition party (the Democrats) and the yellow-shirt movement
(People’s Democratic Reform Committee) in opposing the subsequent Yingluck Shinawa-
tra government. This was not because of her government’s privatization policy, but
because it was promoting the 2014 comprehensive reconciliation law to end the national
political conflict.14 After massive protests, each of the Shinawatra governments was
removed by military coups.15 After taking power, the two military governments took con-
trol of many important state-owned enterprises; then a group of union leaders sought
opportunities to co-operate with the military to try to solve workers’ problems in the
national labour reform activity with involvement in improving state-owned enterprises
and to stop privatizations.16
Under the current junta, unions are regulated tightly. Leaders of state-owned enter-
prise unions had been involved in national IR law reform, through a state-controlled tri-
partite committee, but they played only minor roles and later resigned from the
committee. In contrast, despite representing many smaller unions, the 16 national pri-
vate-sector union councils have played more influential roles.17
Certain of the state-owned enterprise workers’ union members are in relatively secure
employment and have at least some decent work aspects. Thus, it is not surprising that
they tend to support the established-conservative political regime and to align with the
yellow-shirts. In contrast, informal workers who are in less secure employment tend to
align with critics of the regime, for example, the red-shirts.
Decent work in two categories of labour market: Types A and B
Thailand’s economic development and decent work practices differ between two distinct
categories of Thai labour market, which we call Types A and B (Table 6).
Type A workers have rights to unionize.18 Type A includes workers in state-owned
enterprises and in certain parts of the private sector, such as banking, electronics and vehi-
cle manufacturing, where there is relatively high union density and generally more plural-
ism than in Type B.
Work in most other parts of the private sector (Type B) is conducted in a context of
relatively weak unionization.19 Type B workers who have no union rights include state
employees (e.g. public servants, judges, lawyers, police and the armed services) and other
public-sector employees (e.g. university staff), workers in small and medium enterprises
(SMEs), as well as workers in informal employment. Type B also includes agricultural
workers (apart from maritime workers). Agriculture is mostly informal, based on families
and self-employed workers. Work in Type B is regulated primarily by unitary forms of
HRM, especially in SMEs.
We focus on evaluating decent work for Type A workers who work in contexts that
generally exhibit more pluralism than in Type B, so there are more prospects for imple-
menting decent work in Type A. This Type A approximates an IR system that Dunlop
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(1993) and Flanders (1970) might have recognized. In Type A contexts, the IR activities of
the state, employers’ and workers’ unions may promote decent work. Nonetheless,
although Thailand is a foundation member of the ILO, the application of ILO labour stan-
dards has been patchy. These labour standards have had only limited success in Thailand
in fulfilling the ILO’s four strategic objectives of its decent work agenda. To what extent
have the strategic objectives of decent work been implemented in Type A contexts?
1. Job creation: the official unemployment rate was <2% between 2001 and 2017, which
seems low, but may not be accurate as most workers are in the informal economy.20
Employment in the formal economy approximates 17 million workers (44% of the total
labour force), but there are more than 21 million workers (56% of total labour force) in
the informal economy.21 Decent work is not merely about employment, but is about
productive employment. Labour productivity growth rate in the formal economy, for
example, averaged only 3.2% a year from 2008 to 2017.22 It is likely to be much less in the
informal economy and among so-called self-employed workers, though reliable data are
not available.
2. Rights at work: Workers in only about 1300 enterprises have the opportunity to join
a union that could represent them. The other approximately 3 million enterprises, espe-
cially the SMEs, do not deal with unions. Only a total of 442, 465 and 490 collective bar-
gaining agreements were registered in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016 (Ministry of Labour
2018).
3. Social protection: Thailand enacted a labour protection law in 1998 which was an
improvement of the 1975 royal decree. But the coverage is low. Most of the 11 million
workers in the agricultural segment (a third of the total workforce) are not covered. The
Table 6 Summary of decent work situation in two types of Thai labour market
Decent work situation: a summary
Job creation Rights Protection Social dialogue
Type A = formal
sector (state-
owned enterprises
and formal parts
of the private
sector)
Smaller part of
labour market;
formal
employment
An IR ‘system’/
employees have
unionization
rights: only
about 1300
enterprises
Limited
employment
protection;
limited
gender
equality
Relatively more
pluralism in
HRM and in
social dialogue;
prospects for
decent work
Type B = public
services and
informal sector
(most agricultural
and urban-self-
employed)
Bigger part of
labour market;
includes
informal
workers and
‘self-employed’
No IR ‘system’/no
unionization
rights: state
employees and
about 3 million
SMEs
Little
employment
protection,
especially for
migrants;
gender
inequality
Unitary HRM;
less-developed
social dialogue;
few prospects for
decent work
Source: the authors.
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minimum wage for unskilled workers first entering the labour market in the private sector
is usually announced annually, after a mixture of bargaining and consultation in the
National Wage Tripartite Committee. This follows the submission of annual demands by
the national unions’ congress, after its May Day Celebration.
As the population of Thailand is ageing, there are labour shortages. Employers may
resolve these shortages by employing migrant workers – around 3.8 million, mostly from
Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, though about half are classified as ‘illegal’ migrants.23
Employers generally see migrant workers as cheap labour and more easily exploitable than
Thai workers (Coca 2016; Human Rights Watch 2010). The decent work agenda applies
to migrant workers (especially the ‘illegal’ ones), then, to an even lesser extent than to
most native Thai workers.24
4. Social dialogue: This is practised mainly through a tripartite system. The national tri-
partite committees of government, employers and workers have operated at least since 1975.
About 20 such committees have been established. They are mostly chaired by high-ranking
government staff. The committees focus mainly on minimum wages, IR, health and safety
and social security, but their legally specified roles are narrow and limited further by the state’s
tendency to exercise control. Under the military rule, however, the government’s role in pro-
moting social dialogue between employers’ and workers ‘organizations has been greatly
reduced compared to what it was under parliamentary democracy.25
Turning to gender, Thai union leaders are predominantly men. Relatively few unions
have women’s divisions or special programs directed at promoting women’s participation
in union activities. Women have only a limited presence in settling workplace disputes in
the judicial institutions, such as the Labour Court and tripartite committees or in gaining
relatively powerful positions such as associate judges. The gender pay gap is much greater
in the private sector in municipal (urban) areas than in non-municipal (rural) areas. But
there appears to be a very small gender pay gap among state employees in urban and in
rural areas. In rural areas, the average pay for women is consistently higher than that of
men, though by only a small margin (Thonguthai 2002).
In short, the implementation of decent work has been inconsistent in Thailand. Since
the 1990s, the state labour offices have tried to promote some aspects of the decent work
agenda with encouragement from the ILO, such as workplace health and safety, working
conditions of informal workers, of child labour and of domestic workers, but again imple-
mentation is limited.26 This may reflect Thailand’s relative lack of ratification of ILO’s
labour standards to promote decent work, as summarized above. Although Thailand has
not formally ratified any of the ten ILO labour standards on IR, its labour regulation to an
extent reflects certain other ILO labour standards.27
Conclusions
Returning to our initial research questions of how we can characterize Thai capitalism,
Thailand does not fit easily into either the CME or LME ideal type. If anything, its mixed
characteristics make it look like ‘a hybrid’ variety of capitalism.
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In answer to question 2 about the context for HRM and IR in Thailand, we identify
two distinct types of labour markets in Thailand: Type A, with HRM approximately in a
pluralist IR context, and Type B, with HRM in more of a unitary context. Consequently,
there is more scope for implementing decent work under Type A than under Type B
labour markets. The latter adopts the state’s and employers’ interests and tends to adopt a
unitary frame of reference with little or no unionization or freedom of association. This
context applies to most SMEs and the many informal workers who are in Type B labour
markets.
Turning to question 3, which asks what the situation is with decent work in Thailand
and how is it related to the politics, ILO labour standards and labour law, we find that, in
spite of Thailand having been a member of the ILO for a century, the impact there of ILO
labour standards that relate to the decent work agenda is patchy. This reflects the limited
scope of the IR system, the restricted union coverage and activity, as well as the inconsis-
tent legal implementation of the ILO’s labour standards. Although it has ratified only a
small number of the ILO labour standards, the Thai state might argue that it has aimed to
reflect informally additional ILO labour standards. But, since Thailand has not actually
ratified most of them, the ILO cannot monitor their implementation. In short, Thailand is
not fully meeting the four strategic goals of decent work.
Suggestions for theory, policy, practice and research
Theory
From Thailand’s experiences, we infer three propositions that would be worth exploring
further in Thailand as well as in other contexts.
1 In an emerging economy where democracy is not institutionalized, workers and their
unions in the formal labour market that offers relative employment security tend to
support the established political regime.
2 Workers in the informal labour market that are not unionized and have little employ-
ment security are not likely to experience much decent work and these workers are
likely to oppose the established political regime.
3 A military dictatorship and an undemocratic government is not likely to foster decent
work that includes workers’ rights and social dialogue, but is more interested in job
creation and productivity improvements.
Policy
Since unions have more presence in state-owned enterprises, these unions have been able
to help workers in these enterprises in Type A labour markets to benefit from decent work
provisions to a greater extent than they have for most private-sector workers. Workers in
Type B labour markets, the huge informal labour market and the public services, are not
unionized and so do not experience most of the pluralist characteristics of an ideal-typical
IR system. Hence, there is not much evidence of decent work-type provisions for most
Thai workers, for example, in terms of pay, welfare benefits and employment security.
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State employees, for instance, are employed in a unitary Type B HRM context. This does
not offer decent work according to the ILO’s definition and the context is less favourable
for these workers than for those employed in Type A labour markets, that is state-owned
enterprises and the formal parts of the private-sector (large enterprises).
Being able to organize collectively would help employees to negotiate decent work.
This could improve the quality of their working lives by removing pay and working condi-
tions from competition and by countering other tendencies of globalization that induce a
‘race to the bottom’ in terms of pay and conditions. Furthermore, implementing the
decent work agenda may encourage managers to innovate and to deploy workers in more
productive and innovative ways.28 Higher wages provide a significant benefit that can also
serve to counter poverty and raise people’s standards of living. Accordingly, Thailand
would benefit if it were formally to ratify more of the ILO labour standards and if ILO
monitoring were then to follow. Thailand should follow the example of many other coun-
tries by ratifying more ILO labour standards, especially the conventions on Labour
Administration, Co-operation and Consultation at the Levels of the Undertaking, Indus-
try and Nation, Tripartite Consultation and IR in Public Services.
Nevertheless, ratification is not a panacea. Enacting a law does not necessarily mean
that the law is always enforced successfully. Enforcement takes time and an appropriate
institutional and regulatory framework. We would encourage Thailand’s key IR actors
and other advisors, including the key state, union and employers’ organizations, and a
supporting cast of academics and NGOs proactively to promote decent work to a greater
extent. This would help to sustain Thailand’s continued development and to foster co-
operation on labour issues among ASEAN member states. Its institutional machinery,
such as the National Labour Development Advisory Council, has not been effective in
promoting decent work. Therefore, Thailand might consider reforming to develop a more
effective tripartite national institution that can foster improvements by helping to imple-
ment the spirit of the decent work agenda in changing Thai labour markets.
When reforming such an institution, Thailand should design its own institution, one
that is appropriate for its emerging-economy status with an informal economy that is lar-
ger than its formal economy. The ILO could help Thailand to reform or develop such an
institution. Thailand might also learn from the experiences of other countries with neutral
institutions; for example, Australia and the United Kingdom have such institutions that
play vital roles: in Australia, the Fair Work Commission and Fair Work Ombudsman; in
the United Kingdom, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (Acas) and
Employment Tribunals.29 Closer to Thailand, in the ASEAN Community, the regulation
of Singapore’s employment relations through a network of mostly tripartite institutions
guided by a Ministry of Manpower (Leggett, Kuah and Gan 2017) might offer another
model to learn from. In view of significant contextual differences with Thailand, however,
such examples are ones to learn from, not necessarily to emulate.
A new or a redeveloped national institution could advise employing organizations
how to reform their HRM, for instance, by trying to move from unilateral approaches to
more participative ones that aim to foster employee involvement, and accept ILO IR
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labour standards. In co-operation with the new institution, academic advisors, unions
and labour NGOs, the Personnel Management Association of Thailand could also be one
of the prime movers to facilitate such reforms.
Practice
In practice, the promotion of decent work based on ILO labour standards should not dis-
advantage Thai entrepreneurs (though they might complain in the short-term). In the
longer term, more decent work in Thailand would encourage the competitiveness of Thai
enterprises and increase their productivity. This should improve Thai people’s working
lives, as well as advancing Thailand’s economic and social development. Such improve-
ments, through the efficient formalization of law and well-functioning IR institutions, are
more likely to be achieved and sustained under parliamentary democracy than under mili-
tary governments. Implementing the decent work agenda is more likely if it is attempted
in a context of free expression and debate.
To facilitate the progress of decent work for all types of workers, it would help if Thai
labour law were reformed to include ILO labour standards. Such inclusions might help the
nation escape being controlled by conservative elites. In addition, it would help if Thai
labour laws were codified by systematically integrating the fragmented existing labour laws.
Future research
One limitation of this article is that it is based on analyses of ILO labour standards, decent
work, laws and other relevant documents, observation of meetings as well as interviews
with key informants. Future research on HRM and IR in Thailand should include more
mixed methods including, for instance, workplace case-studies and surveys of employers
and workers in Type A and Type B contexts.30 Further research would be beneficial, not
least because we could learn more about the practice of HRM and IR as well as the imple-
mentation of collective agreements, labour laws, ILO labour standards, productivity, tech-
nological innovation and the extent of decent work in such emerging economies as
Thailand. More research on HRM and IR at enterprise level is crucial to glean the infor-
mation necessary to design evidence-based policies and improvements. This should help
us to develop better theoretical explanations and practical applications of IR and HRM in
Thailand and also in other countries, especially other emerging economies.
Notes
1 These ILO labour standards include 189 conventions (C), 205 recommendations (R), 6 declara-
tions and 6 protocols (www.ilo.org, accessed 14 Jan 2018).
2 www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 4 Mar 2018).
3 In terms of gross domestic product at purchasing power parity. www.cia.gov/library/publi
cations/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/th.html (accessed 16 May 2018).
4 For an analysis of different categories of economy in Asia, see Bamber and Leggett (2001).
5 https://data.worldbank.org/country/thailand (accessed 14 Jan 2018).
6 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=TH; comparison in terms of
purchasing power parity (accessed 14 Jan 2018).
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7 On the classic distinction between a unitary and pluralist frame of reference, see Fox 1974.
8 For example: https://cleanclothes.org/issues/faq/ilo (accessed 15 May 2018).
9 www.ilo.org/global/topics/decent-work/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 14 Jan 2018).
10 The first plan (1961–1966) was called National Economic Development Plan, but from the sec-
ond plan (1967–1971), the name was the National Economic and Social Development Plan.
11 Australia would also be closer to an LME than a CME. However, Mitchell et al. (2011) ask if Aus-
tralia might also be seen as ‘a hybrid’ that shows mixed characteristics.
12 See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13294268 (accessed 30 Apr. 2018).
13 Based on observations of and reports about many meetings, for example, held by the govern-
ment, national union councils and National Reform Commission, in the period 2000–2018.
14 Interviews with Paiboon Kaewpaytai, former secretary of a state-owned enterprise workers’
union; and Prasit Kaiganokwong, former vice president of a state-owned enterprise workers’
union, 23 Feb. 2018.
15 www.wsj.com/articles/in-thailand-a-struggle-for-control-of-state-firms-1402930180 (accessed 4
Feb 2018).
16 Watts and Chaichalearmmongkol (2014); interview with Apsorn Krissanasmit, President, State
Enterprise Workers’ Federation of Thailand, 28 Dec 2017. State-owned enterprise workers’
unions are divided into two national federations: the State-owned Enterprise Workers’ Union
Relations Confederation (SEWURC) and the State Enterprise Workers’ Federation of Thailand.
SEWURC supports the yellow-shirts.
17 Interview with Chalee Loysoong, a former private-sector union leader, 7 Dec 2017.
18 Labour Relations Act (1975).
19 Among state-enterprise employees, union density is 38.4%. Among non-agricultural employees,
union density is 3%, http://relation.labour.go.th/index.php/2017-08-25-04-50-47; http://gfmis-
soe.sepo.go.th/list/knowledge; http://service.nso.go.th/nso/nsopublish/themes/files/lfs59/report
Jun.pdf (accessed 28 Feb 2018).
20 https://tradingeconomics.com/thailand/unemployment-rate (accessed 8 Dec 2017).
21 http://service.nso.go.th/nso/web/survey/surpop2-2-4.html (accessed 8 Dec 2017).
22 CEIC (2017) https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/thailand/labour-productivity-growth (ac-
cessed 25 Feb 2018).
23 Labour Minister, Pols. Gen. Adul Sangsingkeo, on Channel 3 TV, 19 Feb 2018.
24 www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/23/tiger-crocodile/abuse-migrant-workers-thailand; (https://www.
laborrights.org/releases/migrant-workers-prosecuted-reporting-exploitation-thailand, (accessed
1 Feb 2018).
25 Interviews with Kovit Burapathanin, former Director, International Cooperation Bureau,
Ministry of Labour, 7 Dec 2017; Thanakit Sasopa, President, Honda Labour Confederation of
Thailand, 28 Dec 2017.
26 On workers’ health and safety, see websites such as: www.ilo.org/safework/countries/asia/thaila
nd/lang–en/index.htm; on informal workers: www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/fea
tures/WCMS_177229/lang–en/index.htm; www.wikigender.org/wiki/informal-workers-in-thaila
nd; on child labour: www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/thailand; www.ilo.
org/asia/projects/WCMS_161095/lang–en/index.htm; on domestic workers: www.nationmulti
media.com/news/life/art_culture/30303908; www.voanews.com/a/domestic-workers-overworked-
in-thailand/3248937.html (all accessed 2 May 2018).
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27 These include conventions 87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize,
C98; Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, recommendation; 130 Examination of
Grievances Recommendation and C135 Workers’ Representatives.
28 Allen (2011) develops a similar argument in relation to relatively high wages in Britain, which
induced much innovation and laid the groundwork for the scientific and industrial revolutions
to take place there, rather than elsewhere.
29 For more on such institutions and their contexts, see: Bamber et al. (2016), chs 2 & 5.
30 Workplace surveys are challenging to conduct in countries that have a big informal economy,
but it would be worth trying and could contribute much knowledge about HRM and IR in such
contexts. For information on countries with a long experience of such surveys, see for example
Brown et al. (2009).
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Appendix 1
Ratification of ILO core labour standards by non-ASEAN members included in
ASEAN+6 countries
Country Convention Ratification total
87 98 29 105 100 111 138 182
China ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ U U U U 4
Japan U U U ✗ U ✗ U U 6
South Korea ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ U U U U 4
Australia U U U U U U ✗ U 7
New Zealand ✗ U U U U U ✗ U 6
India ✗ ✗ U U U U U U 6
✗ = non-ratification,U = ratification.
Source: ILO (2017a).
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Appendix 2
Categories of ILO international labour standards
1 Freedom of association, collective bargaining and industrial relations
2 Forced labour
3 Elimination of child labour and protection of children and young persons
4 Equality of opportunity and treatment
5 Tripartite consultation
6 Labour administration and inspection
7 Employment policy and promotion
8 Vocational guidance and training
9 Employment security
10 Wages
11 Working time
12 Occupational safety and health
13 Social security
14 Maternity protection
15 Social policy
16 Migrant workers
17 HIV and AIDS
18 Seafarers
19 Fishers
20 Dockworkers
21 Indigenous and tribal peoples
22 Specific categories of workers
23 Final articles
24 Another category that is not elsewhere classified
Source: ILO (2017b).
Appendix 3
The ILO’s key IR standards
1 C87 – Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
2 C98 and 154 – Collective Bargaining
3 C135 – Workers’ Representatives Convention
4 C144 – Tripartite Consultation
5 C150 – Labour Administration
6 C151 – Public Service Industrial Relations
C, Convention.
Source: ILO (2017b).
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Appendix 4
The ILO’s legal indicators of decent work
1 Labour administration
2 Government commitment to full employment
3 Unemployment insurance
4 Statutory minimum wage
5 Maximum hours of work
6 Paid annual leave
7 Maternity leave
8 Parental leave
9 Child labour
10 Forced labour
11 Termination of employment
12 Equal opportunity and treatment
13 Equal remuneration of men and women for work of equal value
14 Employment injury benefits
15 Occupational safety and health (OSH) labour inspection
16 Old-age social security or pension benefits (public/private)
17 Incapacity for work due to sickness/sick leave
18 Incapacity for work due to invalidity
19 Freedom of association and the right to organize
20 Collective bargaining right
21 Tripartite consultations
Source: ILO (2013).
Appendix 5
ILO labour standards on the freedom of association, collective bargaining
and IR
Fundamental conventions on freedom of association and collective bargaining
C87 – Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, 1948
C98 – Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, 1949
Freedom of association (agriculture, non-metropolitan territories)
C141 – Rural Workers’ Organizations, 1975
R149 – Rural Workers’ Organizations, 1975 Instrument with interim status
C11 – Right of Association (Agriculture), 1921
C84 – Right of Association (Non-Metropolitan Territories), 1947
Industrial relations
C135 –Workers’ Representatives, 1971
R143 –Workers’ Representatives, 1971
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C151 – Labour Relations (Public Service), 1978
R159 – Labour Relations (Public Service), 1978
C154 – Collective Bargaining, 1981
R163 – Collective Bargaining, 1981
R91 – Collective Agreements, 1951
R113 – Consultation (Industrial and National Levels), 1960 Request for information
R92 – Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration, 1951
R94 – Co-operation at the Level of the Undertaking, 1952
R129 – Communications within the Undertaking, 1967
R130 – Examination of Grievances, 1967
C, Convention; R, Recommendation.
Source: ILO (2017b).
Appendix 6
Total ratifications of ILO core conventions by ILO member states
Convention Convention name (year) Total
ratifications
Ratification
%
29 Forced Labour (1930) 178 95.2
87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize (1948)
154 82.4
98 Right to Organize & Collective Bargaining (1949) 165 88.2
100 Equal remuneration (1951) 173 92.5
105 Abolition of Forced Labour (1957) 175 93.6
111 Discrimination (Employment & Occupation) (1958) 175 93.6
138 Minimum Age (1973) 171 91.4
182 Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) 181 96.8
N = 187 member states.
Source: ILO (2018).
Appendix 5 (continued)
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